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I. INTRODUCTION

The warp and woof of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act' (IDEA) is participation, discussion and compromise,
and, hopefully, agreement. From the outset, the entire educational
process-notification,
independent
education program (IEP)
numerous
and facilitation-provides
meeting(s),
mediation,
opportunities for parents and schools to find common ground. If and
when these processes do not succeed and a "final" decision is necessary
or desired, the due process procedures encourage agreement during
mediation and resolution sessions.
Given this environment, urging the addition of arbitration to
the dispute resolution procedures might appear to be oxymoronic.
Arbitration is almost the antithesis of participation, discussion and
compromise, but the availability of arbitration as suggested below
would add two improvements to the IDEA dispute resolution system
that experience shows are sorely needed: a more balanced "access to'
justice" and swift and final decisions (at least for a while 2 ). Both of
these improvements would be of material benefit to the person who is
supposed to be the focus of the process: the child.

Residence,
Practitioner
in
*
Distinguished
Seattle University School of Law. Professor Rosenfeld joined the Law School in
September 2001; he supervised the Special Education Clinical program and
established the National Academy of IDEA Administrative Law Judges and
Hearing Officers, which has trained special education hearing officers from over
25 states. In June 2009, he became Director of Education Law Programs. He
currently serves as Chair of the Special Education Section of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (NAALJ). Prior to joining the Law
School, he founded and, for five years, served as Executive Director of COPAA
(The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates), a private, non-profit
organization established to improve the quality and increase the quantity of legal
resources for parents of children with disabilities. In April 2002, he was invited to
testify before the President's Commission on Excellence in Special Education,
which accepted his proposal to establish a system of arbitration for special
education.
120 U.S.C. 1401, et seq. (2012).
2 Given a child's changing needs, not to mention the statutory mandate to
reconsider them annually, no decision concerning special education programming
can be final once and for all. This point is discussed further below.
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When first proposed a decade ago, the addition of an
arbitration option to IDEA received, what can only be charitably
called, a "mixed" reception. 3 Since that time, the inequity of due
process hearings has grown;4 and, particularly, as I have had the
privilege of listening to how hearing officers from across the nation
approach due process hearings,5 I am persuaded that adding

' The suggestion was included almost as an afterthought to prepared
testimony before the President's Commission on Excellence in Special Education:

There should and must be a wide variety of dispute resolution
procedures available for both parents and school districts to
use . . . One additional dispute resolution procedure might be

voluntary but binding arbitration available only upon the
election of both of the parties. I suspect many parents and
schools would be willing to waive their rights of appeal from
such decisions if they were fair, impartial and fast.
U.S. Department of Education Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative
Services, President's Special Commission on Excellence in Special Education,
Dept. of Educ., A New Era: Revitalizing Special Education for Children and Their
Families 41 (2002) (quoting Transcript of Commission Meeting Held in San Diego,
CA
at
141),
available
at
http://education.ucf.edu/mirc/Research/President's%20Commission%20on%20Exc
ellence%20in%20Special%2OEducation.pdf.
The Commission agreed, and recommended that IDEA permit creation of
voluntary binding arbitration systems. See id. So, apparently, did the U.S. House
of Representatives, which included it in the bill it reported. But the U.S. Senate did
not and the provision was omitted in the final compromise bill. My understanding
is that opposition came primarily from the parent community, which was not
surprising given the absence of explanation of how arbitration might work.
4 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (recovery of attorneys' fees); Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49 (2005) (burden of proof in due process hearings); Arlington Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (recovery of experts' fees).
' This has occurred over the last ten years at the National Academy of
IDEA Administrative Law Judges and Impartial Hearing Officers, located at the
Seattle University School of Law, which drew hundreds of special education
hearing officers from approximately half of the states. See IDEA ALJ/HO
Academy,

SEATrLE

UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL

OF

LAW,

http://www.law.seattleu.edu/ContinuingLegalEducation/IDEAALJHOAcadem
y.xml (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). Also, it has occurred during the last four years
at seven trainings for the California Office of Administrative Hearings, which are
organized and conducted by the National Academy for California's special
education hearing officers (ALJs) and mediators. Id. Discussions in both of these
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arbitration as a dispute resolution option will better coincide with the
needs of a significant number of participants in the IDEA process.
Therefore, what follows is not intended to be a classic law
review article, or even a thorough and complete proposal. Rather,
my objective is to briefly note existing problems of the dispute
resolution procedures, outline the major components of an arbitration
system, make some suggestions on how to implement some of those
components and call for further suggestions where more thought is
required. It is, in other words, a snapshot of the current status of the
proposal,6 reflecting development at the time of the Pepperdine
symposium presentation, as well as recent discussions with parents,
education agency personnel, attorneys who represent both, and local
state and Federal level administrators and regulators.8
forums can be quite candid, as they are open only to currently sitting hearing
officers. Id.
6 About ten years ago, per the request of the Office of Special Education
Programs of developing an arbitration proposal, I informally conducted a
discussion group of persons with extensive experience in various aspects of special
education dispute resolution. While the discussion group agreed that any new
process must be voluntary, informal, and expedited, the group disagreed about
many other aspects. Indeed, most of the participants believed that an additional
dispute resolution process was neither necessary nor desirable. They preferred,
instead, that changes be made in the existing dispute resolution methods, such as
due process and mediation. And while there was widespread agreement that due
process had become too cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming, there was
very little agreement on how these problems might be remedied.
I suggest that most of these misgivings arise from two fundamental
concerns: (1) an unwillingness to forego the protections afforded by current law,
even though they may not be available to many of those affected, and (2) the
difficulty in evaluating the process outside of traditional legal practices. The first
concern is important in assuring and specifying the quality of a new dispute
resolution system since it would be unreasonable to expect parents to consent to a
process that can promise no better results for their child and would be arbitrary to
boot. For this reason, it must be beyond question that parental consent to
arbitration is both fully informed and voluntary, and that the decision makers are
truly independent and knowledgeable. These are discussed further below, see infra
Part III.
' Special Education Law Symposium: Examining the IDEA in Theory and
Practice at Pepperdine University School of Law (Feb. 10, 2012).
1 A similar presentation, The Casefor Voluntary Binding Arbitration:It's
Not What You Think, was made by the author at CADRE's 5th National
Symposium on Dispute Resolution in Special Education in Eugene, OR (Oct. 26,
2011). Further, I have had numerous information discussions with attorneys
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II. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT MECHANISMS

Current dispute resolution mechanisms satisfy few, if any,
problems of the parties involved.9 While mediation may appear to be
more favorable than due process hearings since most disputes are now
resolved through mediation, accurately gauging public preference is far
more complicated. Further, few would quarrel with the proposition that
anyone has a good view of due process hearings-including many of
the people who conduct them.' 0
But it is probably true that mediation at least offers a better
chance of addressing and ameliorating the emotional divide that has
Even so, the
arisen between parents and school personnel."
variations in how mediations are conducted, who conducts them, why
and how the parties engage in the process, pre-existing expectations,
and (most importantly) outcomes clearly indicate that results leave
much to be desired.' 2 Therefore, it is difficult to avoid the

representing education agencies and schools, education agency personnel and
teachers, and parents and parent groups.
I It is important to distinguish between the procedures set forth in IDEA
to encourage parent participation in objective identification, testing and assessment
of children with disabilities, from the dispute resolution mechanisms themselves,
primarily mediation (of various types) and due process hearings.
1o My experience, after listening to private informal discussions of the
hearing process for over ten years by hundreds of hearing officers (both
administrative law judges and contract hearing officers) from across the nation,
indicates that while the large majority of special education hearing officers are
dedicated to doing the best job they can, many officers are as frustrated by the
inequity of the proceedings since the parents appear pro se and have the limitations
imposed by the process, and what most perceive as the narrow focus of their role.
A persistent concern has been the lack of specific authority or guidance at the
federal level, leaving pro se parents with no alternative but to rely on state law,
which is too often inapposite, at best.
" Even mediation is intended primarily to facilitate settlement, not to
determine who is "right." Steve S. Goldberg, Special Education Mediation:
Responding to a Proposalfor Reform, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 127 (2001). This may be
important for future relations of the parent(s) and the school personnel, but it is a
clear indication that the child's interests are somewhat secondary.
12 In reviewing requests for pro bono representation by our law school
clinic over a period of four years, I was amazed at how many applicants submitted
mediation settlement agreements that were so imprecise as to be rendered
unenforceable. Many parents frankly admitted that they did not know when they
signed the agreement, or that they believed the school district would make a broad
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conclusion, that mediation is often perceived as a "poor man's"
alternative to a due process hearing, a settlement for the best that can
be obtained in the absence of legal representation.
This is not to say that due process hearings are more
satisfying. Perhaps the most revealing concise characterization of
how due process hearings are perceived is the title of chapter 10 of
the Fordham Foundation Report: Nasty, Brutish . . . and Often Not
Very Short-identified as The Attorney Perspective on Due
Process.'3 [Emphasis supplied.] If that title can be said to accurately
represent the view of those who have only professional involvement
in the process (and those who may reap substantial financial benefit
from it), it does not take much imagination to opine what the
participants think. Most education agency personnel such as
teachers, related service providers, and administrative personnel are
trained to collaborate, and view the adversarial atmosphere of a due
process hearing as a nightmare. Supervisory personnel are somewhat
more objective because of their greater experience. However,
supervisory personnel still find the demands of a due process hearing
as an expensive and negative "drag" on their primary goal of
administering an educational program. Therefore, both groups view
the procedural (legal) focus of the process as mostly irrelevant to
what they are supposed to be doing.
Further, the overwhelming majority of parents see themselves
as "David against Goliath"-whether assayed from emotional,
knowledge or resource viewpoints.14 There has been a long-standing
consensus that very few, if any, disputes (even a divorce) involve
greater emotional tension than a parents' desires and attempts to
secure adequate educational programs and services for their child.
Similarly, even though most reasonably sophisticated parents may
have a well-grounded and practical knowledge of what it takes to
navigate the current special education system, only the "one percent"

good faith effort to reach objectives discussed in the course of the mediation, but
not explicitly stated in the agreement.
13 Lanigan, Audette, Dreier and Kobersy, Rethinking Special Education
for a New Century 213 (2001).
14Most of this is due to the problem that the large majority of parents are
either unable to locate or afford counsel. While this problem is not unique to
special education, the fact that the dispute concerns children with disabilities seems
even more unjust.
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can be confident that they have the financial resources to both obtain
and retain the necessary expertise.
The playing field was tilted even further during the last
decade by three United States Supreme Court decisions concerning
the criteria for the recovery of attorneys' fees, the allocation of the
burden of proof in due process hearings, and the recovery of fees for
experts. First, Buckhannon Board & Care Home Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health & Human Services, a case involving
the Fair Housing

Amendments Act and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), held that parties are entitled to the recovery
of attorneys' fees when they prevail on the merits of their claims by
receiving "at least some relief," which can be even nominal
damages.1 6 That ruling has uniformly been held to apply to IDEA's
fee provisions. Schaffer v. Weast17 held that the party who files the
request for due process has the burden of persuasion at the hearing; in
practice, that is almost always the parents.' 8 Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v. Murphyl9 held that section
1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA does not authorize prevailing parents to
recover expert fees even though the parents prevailed on the merits of
the claim because of the importance of expert testimony in an
overwhelming majority of IDEA cases. 20 Therefore, even if the
parents are successful, complaining parents must find a way to secure
expert witnesses without the expectation of being reimbursed for
expert fees even if they are successful. In combination, these three
rulings have proved that there is almost an insurmountable barrier to
successful pursuit of due process and the civil litigation that follows.
In addition, there are problems regarding the time required to
exhaust the legal process. For many, if not most, a final decision will
come well past the time it can be of any benefit to the most important
party: the student. A frequent consequence is that, over time, the
dispute tends to become more focused on the needs, desires, and
frustrations of the parties, as opposed to the educational needs of the

1 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
See id. at 603-04.
" 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
8 See id at 62.
16

19
20

548 U.S. 291 (2006).
See id. at 293-94; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006).
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child. 2 1 And the hearing process, itself, has some serious defects.
Many hearing officers are faced with the obligation to decide
between proposals that they are not well trained to evaluate.
Moreover, because of fears of being perceived as partial, many
believe themselves handcuffed in asking for or requiring additional
information from either of the parties that they suspect may be
important, if not crucial, in deciding the case before them.22
III. SYSTEMIC OBJECTIVES OF ARBITRATION
As proposed below, the option of arbitration would correct
many of these problems. Perhaps most important, by eliminating the
need for attorneys it would create the basic equity of process that
Congress presumably intended. This should also reduce the adversarial
atmosphere of the proceeding.23 Equally important, there would be a
much shorter timeline for decision and implementation; and, in most
disputes, the focus would clearly be on the student's educational
program, thereby enhancing the student benefit that underlies the
purpose of the statute. The expertise of the decision-making body
would be increased by vesting responsibility in a panel consisting of a
disability expert, an educator, and a lawyer. And, finally, by virtue of a
combination of all these factors-shorter decision timeline, greater
expertise, better focused objective and less "legal maneuvering"-the
overall costs of dispute resolution should be reduced.

21 Not surprisingly, parents tend to take school disagreements personally.
According to the parents, school personnel (and their counsel) often cite the
"problem" of setting a precedent as a reason for not agreeing to provide what
otherwise appears to be an appropriate program for the specific child in front of
them, apparently overlooking or ignoring the individualized focus of IDEA.
22 Perhaps the best illustration of this is the fact that section 300.502(d),
authorizing hearing officers to request (on their own motion) an independent
educational evaluation (IEE) as part of the hearing, is essentially a dead letter. Of
the hundreds of hearing officers who have attended the Academy in Seattle over
ten years, only two officers requested an IEE on this authority. A frequent
explanation for failure to do so is the concern about an officer not appearing
impartial. This reluctance to "develop the record" is also particularly surprising
given the general perception that a special education due process hearing is usually
considered to be a "somewhat less than formal" administrative proceeding.
23 Or, if not eliminate due process hearings, at least transfer it to the
arbitrators, which might be a considerable benefit.
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The following section provides a more detailed identification
and discussion of the various factors that would be incorporated into
the arbitration model and how those incorporated factors would
function. To be clear, where substantial questions remain, some of
the possible alternatives are identified. None of this is meant to be
exhaustive; to the contrary, it is set forth in the hope and expectation
that others can and will identify oversights and make additional
suggestions.
A. Consent to ArbitrationMust be Explicit, Voluntary, and
Fully Informed
Consent to arbitration must be fully informed and completely
voluntary. This is fundamental for both equitable and practical
reasons, and cannot be too strongly emphasized. Given the nature of
special education disputes, there is little likelihood that such a
proposal would be utilized if either of the parties, but especially the
parents, did not have complete confidence that they understood what
they were gaining and giving up. Equally important for many, or
even most, parents, a full understanding of the arbitration process is
likely to enhance its attractiveness. 24 It is also a crucial factor in
establishing the finality of the arbitration proceeding.2 5
Thus, the more difficult question is how to assure that the
consent is fully informed and voluntary. A common method of
providing that assurance under our legal system has been to rely on
the support and advice of counsel. But, as noted above, one of the
chief objectives of the proposal is to remediate the inability of the
parents to secure or retain counsel. It should be clear that, given the
importance of assuring that any consent is truly informed and
voluntary, simply making written materials available and explaining
the "pluses and minuses" of consenting to arbitration does not satisfy
the required standard.2 6
Nor do written materials allow the
This is not just a supposition. In explaining to many parents what I had
in mind beyond the basic concept of arbitration, the large majority became more
receptive to the concept the more they heard about it.
25 See infra Part III.B.
26 This is apparent to anyone who has tried to draft a "plain English"
document about anything but the simplest legal procedure, which is not how IDEA
procedures have been traditionally described. More to the point, one can point to
24
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opportunity for questions and explanations that should underlay truly
informed consent.
For the foregoing reasons, it seems necessary to provide some
limited access to an independent person whose obligation, broadly
speaking, would be to explain the IDEA procedural options and the
consequences of submitting to a voluntary binding process. To
minimize the cost and burden, a general written explanation should
be prepared 27 that would include the major points to be conveyed and
common questions, as well as initial responses and explanations. The
independent person would be responsible for walking the parent(s)
through the written explanation, responding to questions and
explaining variations in state practice and procedure in state
terminology. Although I have no data to support an estimate of how
long this might take, my "educated" guess would be an average of no
more than three hours.
This function could be performed by a number of
possibilities, none of which is clearly superior or exclusive. Perhaps
the most obvious would be specially trained employees of state
protection and advocacy agencies and other state and local advocacy
organizations. Another possibility would be law school clinical
programs. And, I would not exclude attorneys in private practice,
provided that their activities were carefully limited and reasonably
compensated.28 But, it should be clear that any attorney who
performs this task with Parent A is thereafter unable to represent
Parent A in any capacity in a proceeding arising from that
consultation.
the written copies of IDEA's procedural safeguards liberally distributed by most
school districts and ignored as incomprehensible by most parents.
27 It remains to be determined who would prepare the basic written
document and make the determination that the document satisfies its intended
purpose. This is discussed further, infra Part IV, at "Related Issues to Be
Addressed." However, historical experience recommends that this decision not be
made by existing federal or state level regulatory agencies, neither of which tends
to be artful in providing simple, readable explanations.
28 The limitations would be carefully spelled out in the package that
contained the general written explanations. Funding might be supervised and
provided by state bar associations as a method of satisfying common pro bono
obligations. Thus, for example, an attorney, whether in public or private practice
would request to be added to a roster of available persons and agree to a maximum
compensation of three hours at a rate established by the state bar equal to a predetermined average hourly rate for the state.
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In addition to the customary information concerning IDEA
rights and procedures, however, there should be explicit statements
concerning the conduct, scope, and authority of the arbitration panel.
These should include notification and explanation of the following:
that no attorneys, whether as counsel or participant, can
be present in the arbitration proceeding unless the parent
explicitly consents or is represented by counsel;
that rules for conduct of the proceeding shall be set at the
complete discretion of the arbitration panel;
that the arbitration panel has complete discretion to
determine the nature and scope of the evidence (witnesses
and documents) it will seek or hear;
that the record of the proceeding will be confidential and
that substantive challenges to the decision can be heard
only by the arbitration panel, itself;
that both parties consent to implement and abide by the
decision of the arbitration panel, within any specified
timelines within five working days from issuance of the
arbitration decision, or post a bond in the amount set by
the panel.

a)

b)
c)

d)

e)

B. The ArbitrationDecision Must Be Finaland Binding
At first blush, this requirement might appear to be obvious, as
many arbitration proceedings are undertaken as final and binding.29

29

The very purpose of contractual arbitration is to avoid the
courts. Therefore, the courts have long held that there is no
right of appeal from an arbitrator's award; any decision is final
and binding. The only exceptions are where the arbitrator
clearly exceeds his authority or had a conflict of interest.
Adam Morris, Supremes Open Small Window to Arbitration Appeal, AARON
MORRIS'

BuSINESS

LAW

ALERT

(Sept.

7,

2008)

http://www.businesslawalert.com/2008/09/articles/employment/the-supremesThe article discusses a then-recent
open-small-window-to-arbitration-appeals/.
decision by the California Supreme Court recognizing the right to appeal an
arbitration award where the arbitration agreement provided that "the arbitrators
shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award
may be vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any
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But there are serious and legitimate public policy and juridical
concerns about placing insuperable bars to appeals of arbitration
proceedings. 30 By contrast, the importance of the finality of a special
education arbitration proceeding is difficult to understate. Parents
who agree to arbitration will most likely view it as a way around their
inability to locate or afford counsel, 31 as is intended. However, there
would be no reason to do so, if following the arbitration proceeding,
the education agency could easily appeal the outcome to a traditional
civil litigation forum. For this reason alone, consideration must be
given to making appeal of the arbitration proceeding as difficult as
possible.3 2
However, there is also another reason, only somewhat less
important. If an arbitration proceeding can be appealed, even with
some difficulty, the likelihood is that those losing education agencies
will appeal. In this scenario, therefore, the arbitration proceeding
becomes just another costly litigation hurdle to be endured.
Consequently, that possibility substantially undercuts the contention
that the availability of arbitration can reduce the costs of dispute
resolution on a systemic basis. To state the obvious: less litigation,
less cost.
such error." Id. (quoting Cable Connections, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc. 44 Cal. 4th
1334, 1340 (2008)).
30

There exists a clear tension concerning the finality of arbitral
awards. On the one hand, one of the principal benefits of
arbitration is, or at least used to be, that generally the award is
final and binding upon the parties. Arbitration can thus be a
relatively quick and efficient way to resolve a dispute. On the
other hand, as arbitrators are asked to interpret more complex
legal issues, that same finality is increasingly felt as the
absence of much needed quality control over arbitrators.
Eric Van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial
Review: Arbitral Appeal vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 157, 160 (2003).
Consideration of these questions is beyond the scope of this article.
3 Obviously, there may be other reasons: the near certainty of a quick
decision and, perhaps more important, the expectation that an arbitration
proceeding will focus on their child's educational needs, as opposed to procedural
considerations.
32 This might not be as easy as it sounds, as courts have jealously guarded
their authority as protectors of due process. But it re-emphasizes the importance of
voluntary, fully informed disclosure and the document described in Part III.A.
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None of this reduces the difficulty of precluding judicial
review of an arbitration order. 33 One possibility strongly resisted by
both attorneys and existing decision-makers is limiting the
circumstances of creation, the scope, and the retention period of the
arbitration record.3 4 Another option might be requiring the appealing
party to post a substantial bond, recoverable only if the appeal is
successful.
This option appears to be less drastic, but also less
equitable. After all, if a party can afford to challenge the decision,
e.g., retaining counsel to do so, presumably posting the bond
becomes just another cost.36
C. The ArbitrationDecision Should Be Issued Within Thirty School
Days From Assignment of the Arbitration Request to an
ArbitrationPanel
The general objective should be to begin and complete the
arbitration proceeding as quickly as possible. IDEA regulations
require a due process hearing decision within forty-five days,37 but
only after expiration or waiver of the resolution process, which can
take thirty days. Moreover, the forty-five day timeline can be
extended by the hearing officer "at the request of either party," 38 a
not infrequent occurrence.3 9 Even so, there is a wide spectrum of
3 There are also questions about whether and, if so, when it should be
possible to withdraw from an arbitration proceeding once it has begun. These
remain to be addressed.
34 For example, while it may be desirable, even necessary, to have a
transcript or video or audio recording for the limited purpose of enabling the
arbitrators to prepare a decision, one possibility might be destroying any record
once the decision is reached, but before it is issued to the parties.
3s This could be prescribed in the arbitration order, where the amount of
the bond could be set on a case-by-case basis and adjusted to reflect the financial
capabilities of the respective parties.
3 One way of addressing this potential inequity would be to require the
arbitration panel, itself, to set the amount of the appeal bond for each party, with
recognition that a higher bond can be required of education agencies.
3 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(b) (2012) (timelines and convenience of hearings
and reviews).
3 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2012).
3 Adherence to the forty-five day timeline is one of the few hearing
objectives monitored by the Office of Special Education Programs, probably
because it provides one of the few "objective" criteria of the hearing process.
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opinion about how faithfully the timeline is followed and, depending
upon one's position in a specific proceeding, whether strict adherence
to the timeline is beneficial or not.40
There should be circumstances under which the decision
timeline can be more than thirty days, but these should be extremely
limited and generally agreed to at the outset of the arbitration. To
enable this result, the arbitrators would be vested with broad
authority in the conduct of the proceeding, as discussed below.41
This should follow from recognition of the fact that most delays in
dispute resolution proceedings result from inconvenience. 42 The
arbitrators should be empowered to require expedition of any
subsidiary process needed to complete the proceeding. 4 3
D. The ArbitrationDecision Should Be Specific and Directly
Enforceable by the State EducationAgency
One of the widespread, recurring problems with mediation
agreements and due process hearing decisions is figuring out what to
do with them after they are issued. Even putting aside the wide
variation in their form and content, the mediation agreements and
hearing decisions tend not to be very specific within their four
corners; for example, they often do not spell out precisely what must
be done. Additionally, there tends to be substantial disagreement
about whether they are being properly implemented, and enforceable.
If a procedure is intended to resolve disputes, it should do so.
The arbitration decision should be a quasi-IEP,4 4 for example, the

40 If dissatisfaction with a rule can be a measure of its effectiveness, the
forty-five day timeline is probably a success. The attitude of a party (parent or
school attorney) varies depending upon the particular hearing, but special education
hearing officers almost uniformly object to the lack of flexibility imposed by the
timeline. Their reasons vary widely, ranging from caseload overload to obstruction
from the parties to case complexity.
41 See infra Part III.G.
42 On the attorneys' side, this could be heavy calendars over which they
sometimes have little control; on the educators' side, this could be custom and
contractual agreements concerning working hours and vacations. There appears to
be wide variation among states in dealing with this kind of problem.
43 As I have heard at least one hearing officer to have observed: "That's
what a subpoena is for!"
" A good IEP, obviously.
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decision should clearly identify the short-term goals, spell out any
necessary programs, services to be provided, by whom, their
duration, who is responsible for assuring the provision of the
programs and services, and how and when they are to be monitored.
If possible, the description of the program and service provider
should identify the specific education agency personnel (if they are
the providers) or the specific outside program or service providers, at
least by organization.
The arbitration procedures should also provide that
complaints about the enforceability of the decision should be filed
with the state education agency (SEA) and that the SEA be required
to assure compliance within fifteen calendar days4 5 from the filing of
the complaint. Any such complaints should be limited to whether the
arbitration order has been, or is being, implemented and, if not, why.
The SEA should not be able to review any other substantive or
procedural aspect of the arbitration decision or order, e.g., that the
arbitration decision or order was inappropriate.
E. The Record of the ArbitrationProceedingShould Be Minimal and
Confidentialas a Matter ofLaw
The concept of minimizing the formal record of a decisionmaking proceeding is likely to be extremely controversial, even as its
underlying purpose-minimizing
appeals-may be viewed
favorably. However, the historical record concerning other types of
arbitration reveals a fertile ground for subsequent challenges
concerning procedural (due process) matters.
In truth, it is
impossible to insulate any arbitration proceeding from all such
challenges, however worthy the goal. On the other hand, an
extensive formal record will just provide a larger, probably easier,
target. Accordingly, it seems only logical to specify that the formal
record be minimal and confidential as a matter of law. Precisely
what this might be is one of those matters that require further
consideration.

45 The short period (e.g., 15 calendar days vs. 15 school days) seems
justified given the fact that the education agency was well aware of its obligation.
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F. CounselShould Be PresentDuring the ArbitrationProceeding
Only at the Option of the Parties
Inasmuch as one of the primary objectives of this procedure is
to redress the inherent inequity of unrepresented parents, those
parents should be able to veto the presence of an attorney for the
education agency. This includes both an attorney, as representative,
and any education agency personnel who happen to be attorneys.
Thus, no attorneys would be present, in any capacity, unless the
parents either (1) are themselves represented by counsel or (2) do not
object to the participation of education agency counsel. This
decision would be made at the time the parents provide their
informed consent to participate in the process and would be verified
by the arbitrators.
To be clear, during the arbitration proceeding, the parents
would continue to have the option of being accompanied by a support
person of their choice, whether or not they veto the presence of
education agency counsel. The purpose is to enable any emotional
support that may be helpful in the conduct of the proceeding.
However, this person could not be an attorney or a non-attorney (lay)
advocate.
G. The ArbitratorsShould Have Complete Discretion to Prescribe
the Formalityof andProceduresfor the Proceeding
The arbitration proceeding has the best chance of achieving
its procedural and substantive objectives if the arbitrators are
provided maximum flexibility in ordering and conducting the
proceedings. 46 However, there can be considerable differences
concerning exactly what this means. One approach could be
specification of changes within existing formal procedural rules, such
as relaxation of rules of evidence. Another would be to vest the
arbitrators with more extensive authority, such as ordering extensive
pre-hearing consultations and the ability to limit the time for
presentation and volume of evidence.
To achieve both the broad goals and specific objectives
contemplated by this procedure within the strict timeline given, and
This approach was agreed to even by those who did not favor arbitration
in my original consultations ten years ago, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
46

560

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law judiciary

32-2

to minimize appeals of the arbitration decision based on denial of due
process, the arbitrators should be provided explicit maximum
flexibility to prescribe and control all aspects of the proceeding. 47
This would include setting various timelines, conducting pre-hearing
conferences intended to identify and assure production of necessary
documents and appearances of witnesses, and choosing and
explaining how the proceeding will be conducted (e.g., the extent to
which, if any, counsel will be directly participating, how objections
will be handled, etc.).
Perhaps most significantly, it should also include the ability to
consider issues beyond those specifically stated by the parties in the
request for arbitration. There are two chief reasons for this. The first
is to preclude the parties from seeking, within the short-term,
repeated arbitrations each confined to one or more narrow issues.
The second is to enable the arbitrators to resolve questions
reasonably related, in their judgment, to the issue(s) identified by the
parties. 48

Finally, to enable the arbitrators to implement their
procedures, the panel should be vested with subpoena power. The
enabling legislation should also provide for an expedited appeal
process to resolve challenges to any subpoenas.
H. The ArbitratorsShould Have an Affirmative Obligation to
Develop the Record and Should Be Authorized to UndertakeAny
Steps Necessary To Do So
Under our adversarial system, responsibility for development
and presentation of the record (facts and legal arguments) is the
responsibility of the parties, specifically the attorneys representing
the parties. The attorneys are presumed to know what types of
evidence the decision maker can and will consider as a matter of law.
That is the chief reason why having legal representation is so
important. If, as is proposed here, a central objective is to reduce this
reliance upon attorneys, how will the record be developed?
4 Explicit recognition of, and consent to, this authority should be one of
the items set forth in the signed consent to the arbitration process, as noted in Part
III.A.
48 Needless to say, whether, and how, this authority can be reasonably
proscribed requires further consideration.
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One approach would be to simply let the parties present
whatever evidence each believes is important. Essentially, this is
what happens when a party appears pro se-and it is strongly
disfavored by virtually all decision makers. The more obvious
reasons: crucial evidence may not be offered, too much irrelevant
information may be provided, and proceedings are unnecessarily
lengthened.
A more efficient approach, the one urged here, is to place
responsibility for development of the record on the arbitrators,
themselves. Essentially, this is what occurs in European civil law
systems, where the decision makers are expected to assume an active
role in the process-questioning witnesses and framing or
reformulating issues, as part of their responsibility. 49 The arbitrators
would be expected to assume the controlling role in the processframing or reformulating issues, identifying, calling and questioning
witnesses and requesting documents-as part of their responsibility.
Although the parties and counsel, if present, could be permitted to
submit questions, interrogation actually would be conducted by the
members of the panel. In addition, the arbitrators would have the
authority-and be expected-to request and secure any additional
information they believe necessary to reach the correct decision.
This would include the authority to call expert witnesses and secure
additional evaluations.5 0
I. The Arbitrators Should Consist of a Three-PersonPanel: One
Expert in the Child's PrimaryDisability; One Special Educatorwith
Experience in Administering or ProvidingEducationalPrograms to
ChildrenIdentified with the Child'sPrimaryDisability; and One
Attorney Familiarwith the State's Special EducationLaws and
Dispute Resolution Procedures
Given the expertise required of, and the authority entrusted to,
the arbitrators, it should be obvious that it is absolutely crucial that

It has been suggested that the main difference between continental and
American litigators is that the former are mostly "law adversaries" while the latter
are "law-and-fact adversaries."
so This should clarify an apparently widespread existing reluctance for
impartial hearing officers to request evaluations on their own motion, despite
express authority to do so under existing IDEA regulations, § 300.502(d).
4
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they be completely independent of both parties, focused solely on the
needs of the child, and highly knowledgeable (or have access to such
independent knowledge) about special education. It should be fairly
easy to assure impartiality of the arbitrators by either creating or
adapting one or more existing codes of ethics used by the judiciary,
the bar, or other professional organizations. 5 1 More difficult are
questions concerning the number and background of the decision
makers and their method of selection.
Resolution of these questions usually turns on consideration
and balancing of two factors: the parties' confidence in the integrity
of the decision makers and the parties' respect for their knowledge
and expertise. Both are important in encouraging the parties to
utilize the process, but there does not appear to be any objective
criteria or clinical data clearly pointing to the significance of one
over the other. It could be argued that integrity of the mediators
weighs more heavily in mediations, where confidence in the person is
especially important to success. While, obviously, a mediator's
substantive knowledge concerning the dispute is important, it is not
unfair to observe, broadly speaking, that the mediator's primary
objective is to assist the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable
agreement, and not find "the right answer." In these situations, it
makes a great deal of sense to follow the commonly-urged procedure
whereby each party selects one person who, between themselves,
select a third person, either as a third party or as a single party
mediator.
While similar analysis and conclusions could be applicable to
due process hearings, there are important differences. For one thing,
the objective of a due process hearing is not to find a resolution
mutually acceptable to the parties, but to specify a resolution, which
may not be acceptable to either party, in whole or in part. Moreover,
it could be argued that the substantive objective of the hearing is to
find "the right answer": the "right answer" as a matter of law. And it
is important to remember that the right answer "as a matter of law"
may be very different from the right answer as a "matter of fact."

sI For example, the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
(usually referred to as the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics) was substantially revised
effective March 1, 2004 to make the Code of Ethics virtually identical to the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
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Within this framework, arbitration is even more different
from mediation than is a due process hearing. There is a similarity in
that both a due process hearing and arbitration reach a resolution that
may not be fully coincident with either of the parties. But the
important, perhaps more critical, difference is that the arbitration can
reach for the "right answer as a matter of law and fact." 52 This may
prove to be especially important when it is the interest of a third
party, the student, that is being considered.
These factors emphasize the importance of expertise by the
decision makers. For these reasons, it is recommended that the
arbitration decision be reached by a three member panel consisting of
(1) a person with expertise in the child's primary disability; (2) a
special educator with experience in administering or providing
educational programs to children identified with the child's primary
disability; and (3) an attorney familiar with the state's special
education laws and dispute resolution procedures. The specific
reasons for requiring persons with each of these types of expertise
should be obvious; but, as a general matter, it is important to
remember that fairly technical and sophisticated problems may be
involved, and as experience has shown, all of these types of expertise
are rarely found in one person. 53
Given the nature of the process, it seems logical to place
responsibility for management of the arbitration proceeding in the
attorney-member as primus inter pares, whose chief responsibilities
would be to assure that relevant and sufficient evidence is gathered 54
to support a decision and that the decision includes specific direction
for implementation. Beyond that, the panel members would have
equal authority and weight in the conduct of the proceeding, the
issues in dispute, the types of information to be gathered for the
record, the witnesses to be called, and so forth. These types of
decision, including the final decision(s), would be determined by a
strict majority vote.
52 IS it too much to suggest that being able to find a resolution of a dispute

through determination of the "right answer as a matter of law and fact" is most
likely to resonate as true justice?
" In addition, most issues that arise in hearings demand expertise
concerning disability and education, not law.
54 For example, this would include the issuance of any necessary
subpoenas.
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IV. RELATED ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
There are, of course, a number of questions that need to be
addressed and resolved prior to offering arbitration as an additional
dispute resolution procedure. Perhaps the most obvious is how the
model would be implemented, and specifically, who would be
responsible for its administration and monitoring. This question is
particularly important because it inevitably includes the issue of how
the system is paid for."
Probably the most obvious locus for administration is the
state education agency, which already has final responsibility for
overseeing other special education dispute resolution processes. This
would also comport with the earlier suggestion that enforcement of
arbitration decisions be undertaken by direct filing with the SEA.
But, given the expansive authority of the arbitrators, perceptions of
impartiality are even more important concerning arbitration than they
are concerning mediation or due process hearings. IDEA has always
required that hearings be conducted by impartial hearing officers, 56
but the early record of implementation of this requirement was
spotty, at best, and it is not an exaggeration to note that a significant
number of parents, not to mention their attorneys, believe that many
due process hearing officers are partial to schools.5 7
For these reasons, other possibilities should be considered,
such as bar associations, non-profit advocacy organizations, and law
schools (possibly in cooperation with schools of education). Another
approach might be to adapt the example of other types of arbitration5 8
by establishing a specialized, independent, non-profit organization
whose sole focus would be administration of special education

" This is usually the first question I am asked in presentations, i.e.,
Showcasing Exemplary Practices: CADRE's 5th National Symposium on Dispute
Resolution in Special Education, Eugene, OR (Oct. 26, 2011).
5 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(c) (2012) (Impartial due process hearing).
11 Consideration of possibilities other than the SEA may be particularly
important in states where the SEA is not viewed favorably by parents. This may
also be desirable to determine whether and how non-SEA management results in
different management, results, and implementation.
5 Cf, for example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
which deals with customer/broker-dealer disputes.
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arbitration on a national basis. 59 This approach has advantages
beyond enhancing impartiality and independence. For one thing, it
enables development of the law on a national, rather than a state-bystate, basis, something that has unnecessarily complicated
interpretation and implementation of IDEA, which is, after all, a
federal statute. From a practical viewpoint, it enables the allocation
and assignment of decision makers (arbitrators) on an "as needed"
national basis, rather than requiring each state to maintain a
minimum corps of hearing officers, many of whom may seldom hear

cases.60
Closely related are issues concerning the quality and training
of the arbitrators. This also bears careful consideration given the
history regarding special education hearing officers. It is nothing less
than startling to acknowledge that it took more than twenty-five years
following adoption of IDEA to define the existing minimum
standards for hearing officers. 6' And it is not difficult to argue that,
at least from a national perspective, adoption of these standards has
resulted in a uniform increase in proficiency.62 Every effort should

* This might encompass the entire process, including, for example,
drafting the basic informed consent document as I described in Part III.A.
60 Perhaps a better analogy would be insurance, where a larger risk pool
reduces the per person cost.
61 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (2012).
(c) Impartial hearing officer. (1) At a minimum, a hearing officer
(ii) Must possess knowledge of, and the ability to
understand, the provisions of the Act, Federal and State
regulations pertaining to the Act, and legal interpretations of the
Act by Federal and State courts; (iii) Must possess the
knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with
appropriate standard legal practice; and (iv) Must possess the
knowledge and ability to render and write decisions in
accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice.
Id.

62 There are many reasons for this, most flowing from what, in this

author's view, are two critical defects: the first is the lack of specificity in the
standards, themselves; the second is OSEP's chronic "hands off" attitude toward
monitoring their implementation. It is not be surprising, therefore, to find a wide
variation in the type and quality of hearing officer training among the states, an
indefensible result given the fact that IDEA is a federal statute.
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be made to avoid repetition of this history in creating an arbitration
system, particularly as the arbitration orders will be far more "final."
The additional expense of funding another dispute resolution
system is somewhat more problematic, though ultimately it should
not be that difficult or controversial. A strong argument can be made
that the overall costs of arbitration will be much lower than other
dispute resolution procedures and that the availability of an
arbitration alternative will reduce the aggregate costs of dispute
resolution in special education. Certainly the costs of an arbitration
proceeding as outlined above should be less than any comparable due
process hearing; to these savings must be added the elimination of
costs that would be incurred from appeal of the mediation agreement
of the hearing decision. Under this arrangement, the independent,
non-profit organization could simply bill the state for the cost of any
arbitration arising within that state. Such an approach may be more
attractive than might first be evident because it relieves the state of
the continuing administrative overhead that would be required if
arbitration, like due process, were provided on a state-by-state
basis. 63
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TEST THE PROCESS
This proposal contemplates a major addition to the existing
dispute resolution procedures. However, given the current and longstanding dissatisfaction with both the tenor and quality of the existing
due process hearing system, such an effort is justified.64 If it is
successful, it would reduce inequality in access to legal resources,
increase confidence by parents and education agencies in the
integrity of the system, reduce direct and indirect costs, focus dispute
The organization would also be responsible for maintaining a roster of
persons qualified to be arbitrators, training them as necessary, and selecting them
essentially on a random basis.
I It would be understandable, but mistaken, to conclude from this article
that "due process" has been a failure. To the contrary, the availability of a due
process hearing, and subsequent civil litigation, is and continues to be a necessary
remedy. But thirty-five years of experience have demonstrated that "due process"
suffers many of the problems inherent in our adversarial system-especially its
complexity, cost, and delay. The system of arbitration proposed in this article is
intended to provide an additional dispute resolution process that avoids most of
these problems.
63
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resolution on educational outcome, and minimize disparity in
interpretation and application of the law. These are objectives worth
such an effort.6 5
Such a substantial change should be tested and tuned before
being authorized and adopted on a national basis. Accordingly, it is
strongly urged that the United States Department of Education
establish a pilot project to test its feasibility. For example, a modest
grant administered through a law school, perhaps in cooperation with
a school of education, could recruit a number of states to develop and
test variations on a voluntary basis. The number of states should be
sufficient to reflect many of the variations in results that might be
expected because of population size, historical number of due process
hearings, structure of due process hearing system, and other possible
relevant factors. The trial project should also include variations in
the minimum qualifications and experience of the arbitrators.66 Data
should be compiled for no less than three years; and analysis of
results, including legislative recommendations, should be submitted
to the Assistant Secretary and available for public examination.

65 To be fair, it should be noted that, while existing data appears minimal,

previous arbitration efforts have not been successful. Minnesota apparently briefly
tried a tentative arbitration program, under which an arbitrator was selected from a
state list (unknown who selected the arbitrator), and a binding decision was to be
issued within twenty days. Apparently, no arbitration was ever conducted. Iowa
was reported to have tried a "hybrid" arbitration system, but no data has been
located.
66 It might also be worthwhile to test whether the variability in results that
inevitably occurs from the existence of fifty different sources of arbitrators could
be substantially reduced by having a centralized, uniform source of arbitration
personnel. For example, as part of the pilot program, a corps of arbitration
personnel could be recruited, trained, and made available to some of the
participating states, particularly those with a record of few due process hearings.

